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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper empirically investigates the presence of asymmetric adjustment of the 
sectoral lending-deposit rate spread in the Fijian banking industry, a perspective 
shown from a small island developing state in the South Pacific. Earnings from 
interest rate spreads has been a major contributor to banks’ profit and, hence, is a 
critical ingredient of financial stability. The significance of the financial sector in 
promoting economic growth is well established in the existing literature (Juhro et 
al., 2020; Phan et al., 2020; Ho & Iyke, 2018; Adeniyi, et al., 2012; Ahmed & Ansari, 
1998). The banking sector, which dominates the financial sector in the Pacific 
Island countries, particularly in Fiji, plays a crucial role in mobilizing savings and 
providing financial services in the economy (Juhro et al., 2020). Changes in the 
interest rate spread not only reflect improvement in the banking sector efficiency, 
but also provide insights into the effectiveness of monetary policy and credit 
markets in the economy (Berument et al., 2014). 
Numerous studies have noted asymmetric behaviour in bank deposit and 
lending rates (see e.g. Thompson, 2006; Nguyen and Islam, 2010; Enders & Siklos, 
2001). These studies found that banks are quick to increase the lending rate, 
following a rise in the market interest rate; however, they are slow in adjusting the 
lending rate downward when market interest rates are falling. A delayed downward 
adjustment of the lending rate can limit expansionary monetary policies’ impact 
on the economy, such as Bernanke et al. (1996), Karras (1996), and Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995), observed asymmetric effects of sudden interest rate changes on real 
economic activity. A asymmetric behaviour by banks can be explained by four 
competing theoretical models in the literature (Scholnick, 1999; Thompson, 2006), 
namely information asymmetries, bank concentration hypothesis, consumer 
characteristic hypothesis, and the consumer reaction hypothesis. 
The information asymmetries between banks and their customer base could be 
a potential driver of asymmetric adjustment in the interest rate spread (Thompson, 
2006). Banks would be reluctant or slow to adjust their lending rates to declining 
market interest rates causing the interest rate spread to widen (Thompson, 2006). 
This occurs due to imperfect information when banks and customers enter into 
some business arrangement, making it costly for borrowers to switch to other 
lenders because of some established contractual agreement. The bank concentration 
hypothesis, on the other hand, states that banks in concentrated markets profit the 
most surplus from customers by adjusting their lending and deposit rates distinctly 
in response to changing market rates (Hannan & Berger, 1991; Neumark & Sharpe, 
1992; Nguyen & Islam, 2010). The banks in more concentrated markets are fast to 
adjust their lending rates upward, while reluctant to adjust them downward to 
changing market interest rates. Similarly, banks are fast to adjust their deposit 
rates downward than upward to equilibrium spread to extract the most surplus 
from lending.
Further, the consumer characteristic hypothesis argues that banks adjust their 
interest rates to maximise surpluses relative to the characteristics of heterogeneous 
customers (Rosen, 2002). The larger the number of inexperienced customers 
relative to sophisticated customers, while accounting for search costs, switch costs, 
and adverse selection problems, the slower the banks adjust their lending rates 
downward when deposit rate decreases (Calem & Mester, 1995). On the contrary, 
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the consumer reaction hypothesis by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) states that banks are 
reluctant to adjust their lending rates upward due to possible negative reaction 
from the consumers. As such, consumers will benefit from asymmetric adjustment 
of interest rates in this case. Raising lending rates also have the potential to 
reduce banks’ profit, since high interest rates could discourage safer investors 
from borrowing and could attract more risky investments. Weth (2002) noted 
that large banks in Germany were quick to adjust their lending rates in response 
to falling market rates due to a high risk of their customers switching to credit 
institutions offering attractive market rates. Several studies, using bank-level data, 
find sovereign bond yields, market concentration, bank size, and other individual 
bank characteristics are important determinants of interest rate spread (Aliaga-
Díaz & Olivero, 2011; Almeida & Divino, 2015; Altunbaş et al., 2016; Holton & 
d’Acri, 2018). 
From this literature review, we observe that most of the existing studies 
examining the asymmetric response of banks to changing market interest rates 
used aggregate data or bank-level data, but not sectoral-level data (see Enders 
& Siklos, 2001; Nguyen & Islam, 2010; Thompson, 2006). However, interest rate 
spread generally differs across different sectors of the economy. For instance, 
the interest rate for personal loans is relatively higher than the interest rate 
on house loans, which has not been exclusively studied in existing literature. 
Further, studies mentioned are also heavily skewed to investigating asymmetric 
adjustment behaviour in highly developed or populated developing economies, 
but lack perspective on the issue from small island economies. In light of the 
above arguments, this study examines the asymmetric adjustment process in the 
lending-deposit rates spread for Fiji, a small island economy. More specifically, 
using unique banking data, this study examines the asymmetric adjustment 
behaviour of banks with respect to sector-related lending-deposit rate spread. 
We hypothesize that banks’ asymmetric behaviour in lending-deposit rate spread 
differs across sectors of the Fijian economy. We use the threshold autoregressive 
(TAR) and and momentum TAR (MTAR) models proposed by Enders and 
Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001) to test our hypothesis for asymmetric 
adjustment behaviour among commercial banks. We investigate the asymmetric 
behaviour and possibly discriminatory adjustment of lending rates for nine sectors 
relative to changing time deposit rate. These sectors are agriculture, building 
and construction, manufacturing, non-bank financial institutions, professional 
and business services, private individuals, real estate, transport and storage, and 
wholesale and retail. 
This study adds to the existing knowledge in the following manner. First, it 
provides empirical evidence of asymmetric behaviour of banks’ lending-deposit 
spread in the context of a small island and remote country with a very limited 
and underdeveloped banking sector. Most prior studies examined the asymmetric 
behaviour of interest rates in developed nations with a well-developed and 
efficient banking sector (Enders & Siklos, 2001; Nguyen & Islam, 2010; Thompson, 
2006) or developing countries with a larger banking sector (see Iyke, 2017a, b). 
Most Pacific Island countries, including Fiji, have only a few number banks with 
limited or no competition and the level of efficiency is relatively very low compare 
with developed countries. An analysis of asymmetric adjustment in the Fijian 
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context provides insight into and evidence on interest adjustments by banks in a 
less competitive environment that otherwise is generally lacking in the literature.
Secondly, we examine the asymmetric adjustment behaviour of banks with 
respect to nine sector-related lending-deposit rate spread. Existing studies like 
Enders and Granger (1998), Nguyen and Islam (2010), and Thompson (2006) 
largely use aggregate data. As indicated in Figure 1, the lending-deposit rate 
spread (i.e. the difference between lending rate and deposit rate) vary across 
the time horizon for the weighted average (WA) lending rate. An evaluation of 
asymmetric adjustment for different categories of the lending facility will provide 
insight on the sectoral lending rates that are slower to adjust. An analysis at the 
sectoral level is generally lacking in the existing literature. An analysis of banks’ 
response to changing interest rates will further enhance our understanding of how 
banks in small developing states are likely to adjust their sector-specific lending 
rates during the COVID-19 pandemic.1 
Overall, the findings indicate presence of asymmetric adjustment behaviour 
most sector-related lending-deposit spread. In particular, the lending-deposit 
spread are fast to revert to their long-run position when the spread is widening 
for agriculture, building and construction, manufacturing, non-bank financial 
1 Recent studies have shown that the COVID-19 pandemic has created extreme uncertainty in and 
disruptions to economies and financial markets (see Devpura, 2020; Chen et al., 2020a; Gil-Alana 
& Claudio-Quiroga, 2020; Han & Qian, 2020; Iyke, 2020a, b; Iyke & Ho, 2021; Narayan, 2020a, b, c; 
Prabheesh, 2020; Sharma, 2020). Hence, understanding the interest rate adjustment process during 
the pandemic would be very useful to policymakers in their quest to implement optimal policies to 
curb the negative consequences of the pandemic. 
Figure 1.
The Lending-Deposit Rate Spread of Nine Sectors (January 2000–February 2020)
This graph shows the trends of the weighted average lending rate, time deposit rate, and the lending-deposit spread 
over the period from January 2000 to February 2020. The spread between the average lending rate and deposit rate 
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institution, professional and business services, private individuals, real estate 
and wholesale, and retail sectors than when the spread is narrowing. The results 
indicate that banks in Fiji are reluctant to adjust their lending rates upward 
relative to rising deposit rates due to fear of a negative reaction from high profile 
customers and threats of customers switching to other banks offering attractive 
borrowing rates, which is consistent with the consumer reaction theory. For the 
transport and storage sector, the lending-deposit rate spread depicts symmetric 
adjustment process. These results are supported by robustness checks using the 
MTAR model in conjuction with the basic TAR model.
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II outlines the nature of 
the Fijian banking industry. Section III outlines the methodology and data. Section 
IV discusses the empirical findings. Lastly, Section V concludes the paper and 
states the major policy implications.
II. THE FIJIAN BANKING INDUSTRY
The Fijian financial system is largely dominated by the banking industry (Sharma 
et al., 2014), consisting six commercial banks2, of which five are foreign-owned 
and four are credit institutions3 (Reserve Bank of Fiji, 2017). Apart from this, the 
insurance industry has nine insurers, four insurance brokers and 524 agents, while 
the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) is the sole superannuation provider. 
Although Fiji has a single stock market, the South Pacific Stock Exchange, which 
is relatively small and mostly inactive with only a few listed companies on the 
exchange, and there exist no markets for money and corporate bonds (Sharma et 
al., 2014). 
Commercial banks represent around 51 percent of the total financial sector 
assets, followed by FNPF with 34.8 percent, on average, between 2011 and 
2017 (Asian Development Bank, 2019). The insurance and credit institutions 
only represent a minimal share of the financial sector. In 2003, the total asset 
of commercial banks was $2.6 billion, representing around 59 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP), which rose to $10 billion in 2018, equivalent of 87 percent 
of GDP (see Figure 2). On the contrary, the total assets of credit institutions, on 
average, rose from $0.24 billion (5.6 percent of GDP) in 2003 to $0.69 billion (6.0 
percent of GDP) in 2018. Despite the Reserve Bank of Fiji’s total assets rising from 
$1.05 billion in 2004 to $2.56 billion in 2018, it remained stagnant at 22 percent of 
GDP. 
Commercial banks have been vital in supporting private sector credit growth 
together with declining lending rates (Asian Development Bank, 2019). Private 
sector credit grew from $2.85 billion in 2011 to $4.59 billion in 2017, an average 
growth of 8.3 percent per year representing 82 percent of GDP. The number of bank 
branches increased from 63 in 2011 to 70 in 2017, while the number of automated 
teller machines (ATMs) rose by 45 percent to 325 machines in 2017. 
2 These banks are Australia and New Zealand Banking Corporation Limited (ANZ), Bank of Baroda, 
Bank of South Pacific Limited (BSP), BRED Bank Limited, Westpac Banking Corporation Limited, 
and the locally-owned bank, Home Finance Company Limited (HFC).
3 These credit institutions are BSP Finance (Fiji) Limited, Credit Corporation (Fiji) Limited, Kontiki 
Finance Limited, and Merchant Finance Limited.
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking,
Volume 24, 14th BMEB Call for Papers Special Issue (2021)94
Figure 2.
Banking Sector Assets to GDP (2003–2018)
The graph shows the commercial bank, the Reserve Bank of Fiji, and credit institutions’ total assets to nominal GDP. 
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The cumulative time, savings, and demand deposit, in aggregate, has grown 
by an average of 9.3 percent per year, while the lending component grew by 7.6 
percent per year (Table 1) between 2014 and 2018. The same period experienced 
drastic growth in both savings deposit rate from 0.57 percent in 2014 to 1.32 percent 
in 2018, and time deposit rate from 2.15 percent in 2014 to 3.61 percent in 2018. 
On the other hand, the weighted average lending rate has marginally decreased 
from 5.71 percent in 2014 to 5.69 percent in 2018, while growing by almost 18 
basis points in 2015. According to the Reserve Bank of Fiji (2015), the lending and 
deposit rates had major increment in 2015 as a result of rapid economic growth, 
and increased activities in the real estate, building, and construction sectors.
Improvement in banking services over the years has been vital in providing 
greater access to financial services to Fijians. Remittances, one of the largest 
transfer inflows for many Fijians, has been found to be the major factor in private 
sector credit growth (Chen et al., 2020b). However, according to the Reserve Bank 
of Fiji (2015), banking services are largely clustered in the urban areas and around 
27 percent of adults have limited or no access to financial services, most of whom 
are women, youth, and rural inhabitants. The banking industry has undergone 
several reforms over the years to streamline broader financial access and ensure 
adequate liquidity levels. These include the transformation of savings banks to 
full commercial banks in 1976, the introduction of ATMs in 1993, the introduction 
of Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale (EFTPOS) machines in 1995, and the 
introduction of mobile money in 2010 (Reserve Bank of Fiji, 2017).
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III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A. Methods
We employ the threshold cointegration methodology proposed by Enders and 
Siklos (2001) to investigate the asymmetric adjustment behaviour in the lending-
deposit rate spread of the Fijian banking industry. In comparison, the standard 
cointegration frameworks, which include the Engle and Granger two-stage 
residual-based cointegration, the Johansen cointegration, and the autoregressive 
distributed lag cointegration approaches, assume symmetric adjustment in the 
long-run (see Iyke, 2017a, b; Prabheesh & Laila, 2020). However, if in reality, 
the long-run adjustment is asymmetric and, hence, the model is supposedly 
mis-specified when applying these cointegration frameworks. The threshold 
cointegration methodology consists of two models, namely the TAR and MTAR 
models. Our modelling approach is consistent with Enders and Siklos (2001), 
Thompson (2006), Nguyen and Islam (2010), and Iyke (2017a, b). We hypothesize 
that the adjustment process of the lending-deposit rate spread in Fiji is asymmetric. 
The lending-deposit rate spread is computed as the arithmetic difference between 
the sectorial lending rate and the time deposit rate. The time deposit rate is used 
as the proxy for the deposit rate. Since time deposits have a fixed maturity with 
higher rates as compared to savings deposits, their rates form as the base rates 
for banks in setting up their lending rates. In addition, the time deposit rate tends 
to follow the lending rates quite closely upon further investigation. Further, the 
sectorial lending-deposit rate spread is regressed on a constant and the intercept 
dummies, structural breaks, and the estimated residuals are saved as Sr for model 
estimation and hypotheses testing. The structural breaks used in the estimation 
process are listed in Table 4. The TAR model is outlined as follows:
Table 1.
Deposit and Lending Trend (2014–2018)
This table presents the general trends of commercial banks’ deposit and lending components. The data is sourced 
from the Reserve Bank of Fiji.
Commercial Bank 




Deposit 4,835.0 5,479.8 5,986.4 6,488.5 6,893.0 9.3%
Loans and Advances 5,757.8 6,575.7 6,877.0 7,565.1 7,696.1 7.6%
Rates in percent
Deposits - Savings 0.57 1.01 0.97 1.34 1.32 0.19%
Deposits - Time 2.15 2.71 2.95 3.21 3.61 0.36%
Loans and Advances 5.71 5.89 5.80 5.65 5.69 -0.004%
where ρ1 and ρ2 are the adjustment parameters for above and below thresholds, 
which are expected to be significant and should lie between zero and negative one 
for the assumption of asymmetric adjustment to hold. εt is the disturbance term 
and It is the Heaviside indicator function defined as follows:
(1)
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where τ is the threshold value that can be either zero or non-zero (unknown). 
Chan (1993) provides an approach to estimate a super-consistent threshold value 
by minimising the sum of squared errors used in this study. The threshold value 
is estimated by first obtaining 70 percent of the residuals through arranging the 
residuals in ascending order and removing 15 percent of residual values from 
each side of tail. The threshold value is one that minimized the residual sum of 
squares after iterative model estimation for all threshold values. Overall, if St-1 is 
above the threshold, then the speed of adjustment in Equation (2) is ρ1St-1, whereas 
if St-1 is below the threshold, the adjustment is ρ2St-1. The adjustment parameters 
provide valuable information on the adjustment behaviour. For instance, if ρ2 
is greater than ρ1, than negative disequilibrium is more persistent than positive 
disequilibrium toward the threshold.
On the other hand, the adjustment could also depend on the first difference of 
St-1 and not only the levels. This process is given by as the MTAR model and the 
Heaviside indicator function defined as in Equation (3):
(2)
As opposed to the TAR model in Equation (2), which only captures 
asymmetrically deep movements, the MTAR model in Equation (3) is more suited 
in situations when the momentum is prevalent in one particular direction or has 
relatively asymmetrically “sharp” movements. For instance, if |ρ1| is greater than 
|ρ2| than positive shocks tend to coverge to the threshold quickly, whereas the 
negative shocks persist. According to Enders and Siklos (2001), the power of the 
MTAR test is significantly larger than the Engle–Granger test as well as the TAR 
test for cointegration.
The diagnostic tests for both the TAR and MTAR models are as follows. The 
null hypothesis of no cointegration (ρ1=ρ2=0) is tested against the alternative of 
cointegration using joint F-statistics. When the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
is rejected, the test for asymmetric adjustment is then applied. The null hypothesis, 
which is symmetric adjustment (ρ1=ρ2) is tested against the alternative using 
equal F-statistic. We obtain the critical values for cointegration and asymmetric 
adjustment tests from Enders and Siklos (2001). When both tests are rejected, the 
adjustment in the lending-deposit rate spread is deemed asymmetric. 
B. Data
This paper used monthly data from January 2000 to February 2020, with 242 
observations for the time deposit rate (DR) and the lending rates (LR) for agriculture 
(AGR), manufacturing (MAN), building and construction (BC), real estate (RE), 
wholesale and retail (WR), transport & storage (TS), non-bank financial institutions 
(NBFI), professional and business services (PBS), and private individuals (PI). The 
(3)
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non-bank financial institutions’ lending rate comprises two statutory lenders, two 
money changers, nine foreign exchange dealers, 89 co-operatives and 21 credit 
unions (Reserve Bank of Fiji, 2017). This data can be obtained from the Reserve Bank 
of Fiji. Commercial banks charge different lending rates on loans and advances to 
nine sectors of the Fijian economy. The differing rates show commercial banks’ 
risk aversion behaviour toward different sectors with respect to their overall credit 
rating. The sectorial lending and deposit rates utilized in this study are from the 
commercial banks of Fiji as they are the only institutions engaged in lending and 
deposit financial activities. Monthly data is only available from January 2000 to 
February 2020. 
The descriptive statistics is provided in Table 2. Over the sample period, the 
average time deposit rate was 3.28 percent, reaching its highest of 9.05 percent in 
late 2006 due to limited liquidity in banks (Prasad, 2017). The average lending rate 
for the agriculture sector is relatively high (8.55 percent) compared to other sectors 
due to higher associated credit risks and the sector being vulnerable to frequent 
natural disasters as well as business and financial risks (Li et al., 2013). The lowest 
average lending rate was recorded by the manufacturing and wholesale and retail, 
which reflects the lower associated credit risk in these sectors relative to others.
Table 2.
Summary Statistics of Deposit and Lending Rates (January 2000–February 2020)
This table presents the descriptive analysis of the key variables. The statistics are the mean, maximum, minimum, 
standard deviation (Std. Dev.), skewness, and Jarque-Bera. The abbreviations are as follows: Lending Rate (LR), 
Deposit Rate (DR), Agriculture (AGR), Building and Construcition (BC), Manufacturing (MAN), Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions (NBFI), Professional and Business Services (PBS), Private Individuals (PI), Real Estate (RE), Transport and 
Storage (TS) and Wholesale and Retail (WR) and Weighted Average (WA).
Indicators  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Jarque-Bera
DR 3.28 9.05 1.61 1.55 1.56 153.97
LR AGR 8.55 11.38 6.14 1.56 -0.13 22.12
LR BC 7.03 10.55 4.82 1.43 -0.10 9.97
LR MAN 6.33 8.88 4.71 1.06 0.01 13.15
LR NBFI 7.90 14.26 5.39 1.36 0.82 72.97
LR PBS 7.61 10.73 6.06 0.95 0.21 8.40
LR PI 8.19 10.26 7.02 0.75 0.61 15.02
LR RE 6.57 10.72 4.69 1.39 0.30 9.76
LR TS 7.46 9.52 5.69 1.08 0.36 20.04
LR WR 6.34 9.98 4.49 1.20 0.21 4.73
LR WA 7.04 9.82 5.64 1.03 0.13 11.19
IV. MAIN FINDINGS
A. Unit Root Test
The unit root test results are presented in Table 3. As per the ADF test, all the 
variables are stationary at first difference except for the NBFI lending rate. 
Similar results are obtained from the Phillips–Perron unit root test where the 
null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected for the deposit rate at one percent 
significance level. Both tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit root for the 
NBFI lending rate in level form at one percent significance. The nonlinear unit root 
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking,
Volume 24, 14th BMEB Call for Papers Special Issue (2021)98
test by Narayan and Popp (2010) that allows two structurual breaks is also applied 
as shown in Table 4. Overall, the nonlinear unit root test results are consistent with 
the linear unit root test results, i.e. the ADF and Phillips–Perron test results. In 
the next step, we use the threshold cointegration test as proposed by Enders and 
Siklos (2001) to test for cointegration and asymmetric adjustment.
Table 3.
Augmented Dickey–Fuller and Phillips–Perron Unit Root Test Results
This table presents the unit root test results using the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Phillip–Perron (PP) tests. 
The critical value is 3.43 at 5 percent significance level. The maximum lag selection is based on Akaike Information 
Criterion and both intercept and trend are included in the test equation. The abbreviations are as follows: Lending 
Rate (LR), Deposit Rate (DR), Agriculture (AGR), Building and Construcition (BC), Manufacturing (MAN), Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions (NBFI), Professional and Business Services (PBS), Private Individuals (PI), Real Estate (RE), 
Transport and Storage (TS) and Wholesale and Retail (WR).
Indicator
ADF (Level) ADF (1st Difference) PP (Level) PP (1st Difference)
Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value
DR -2.57 0.29 -15.46 0.00 -3.82 0.02 -20.79 0.00
LR AGR -2.16 0.51 -17.74 0.00 -2.01 0.59 -17.73 0.00
LR BC -1.88 0.66 -14.39 0.00 -2.16 0.51 -14.44 0.00
LR MAN -2.62 0.27 -15.12 0.00 -2.45 0.35 -15.38 0.00
LR NBFI -4.91 0.00 -15.32 0.00 -7.54 0.00 -29.10 0.00
LR PBS -3.48 0.04 -12.95 0.00 -3.00 0.13 -19.33 0.00
LR PI -2.42 0.37 -5.52 0.00 -2.07 0.56 -11.12 0.00
LR RE -2.66 0.26 -19.28 0.00 -2.72 0.23 -19.02 0.00
LR TS -2.45 0.35 -19.05 0.00 -2.90 0.16 -19.77 0.00
LR WR -3.09 0.11 -19.94 0.00 -2.76 0.21 -20.78 0.00
LR WA -2.06 0.56 -10.62 0.00 -1.93 0.64 -10.53 0.00
Table 4.
Narayan and Popp Nonlinear Unit Root Test
This table presents the Narayan and Popp (2010) nonlinear unit root test results that allows two structural breaks. M1 
(model 1) allows for two breaks in level and M2 (model 2) allows for two breaks in the level as well as the slope. TB1 
and TB2 are the potential structural break points when testing for unit root. ** and * represent significance at 5 and 10 
percent, respectively, while k is the maximum lag order. The critical values for the tests are obtained from Narayan 
and Popp (2010). Spread is the arithmetic difference between the lending rate and the deposit rate. For instance, 
the AGR indicator in the table below is the difference between the agriculture lending rate and the time deposit 
rate. Abbreviations for other spreads between lending and deposit rates are BC – Building and Construction, MAN 
– Manufacturing, NBFI – Non-Bank Financial Institutions, PBS – Professional and Business Services, PI – Private 




Statistic TB1 TB2 k
Test 
Statistic TB1 TB2 k
AGR -2.532 2007M01 2012M04 3 -2.522 2007M01 2012M04 3
BC -1.485 2006M11 2007M01 3 -1.581 2006M11 2007M01 3
MAN -1.395 2006M11 2007M04 4 -3.215 2006M11 2012M03 1
NBFI -4.637** 2012M04 2012M06 1 -4.648* 2012M04 2012M06 1
PBS -4.085* 2006M03 2007M01 3 -4.383 2006M03 2007M01 3
PI -0.628 2006M12 2007M02 2 -1.062 2006M12 2007M03 2
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B. Multiple Breakpoint Test
We apply the Bai–Perron approach to test for multiple breakpoints. We suspect that 
due to structural changes in the Fijian economic system and to various financial 
sector reforms over the years, the banking industry might have experienced 
significant transformation. We test this and report the results in Table 5. The results 
show evidence of significant structural changes in the banking industry. The 
breakpoints/structural are accommodated in estimating the residuals of lending-
deposit rate spread when testing for threshold cointegration and asymmetric 
adjustment processes. Accounting for these structural breaks in the test improved 
our overall results and provided robust estimates.
Table 4.




Statistic TB1 TB2 k
Test 
Statistic TB1 TB2 k
RE -3.108 2006M03 2007M01 2 -3.205 2006M03 2007M01 2
TS -4.262** 2006M04 2012M03 5 -4.244 2006M04 2012M03 5
WR -3.314 2006M11 2012M04 5 -1.104 2007M01 2012M04 2
WA -1.979 2006M11 2007M04 4 -4.345 2006M03 2006M012 3
Table 5.
Multiple Structural Breakpoint Test
This table outlines the Bai–Perron breakpoint test results. The structural breakpoints were selected based on the 
Schwarz Information Criterion with a maximum of 5 breaks allowed in the test. The estimated break dates are 
presented in yearly and monthly (numbered) format which are accommodated in the equation when deriving 
lending-deposit rate spread’s residuals. Spread is the arithmetic difference between the lending rate and the deposit 
rate. For instance, the AGR indicator in the table below is the difference between the agriculture lending rate and 
the time deposit rate. Abbreviations for other spreads between lending and deposit rates are BC – Building and 
Construction, MAN – Manufacturing, NBFI – Non-Bank Financial Institutions, PBS – Professional and Business 
Services, PI – Private Individuals, RE – Real Estate, TS – Transport and Storage, WR – Wholesale and Retail and WA 
– Weighted Average.
Spread Schwarz Criterion Multiple breakpoints
AGR 0.159 2005M07 2008M07 2015M01
BC -0.283 2006M01 2011M06 2015M02
MAN -0.03 2006M02 2011M06 2015M03
NBFI 0.692 2003M01 2006M01 2010M10
PBS -0.101 2006M04 2011M04 2014M12
PI 0.083 2006M02 2011M07 2017M03
RE -0.313 2003M04 2006M04 2011M05 2014M12
TS 0.198 2006M02 2011M05 2015M08
WR -0.132 2006M02 2011M03 2014M03 2017M03
WA -0.135 2006M02 2011M03 2015M08
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C. Threshold Cointegration and Asymmetric Adjustment Test
Enders and Siklos (2001) recommended testing threshold cointegrating 
relationship using either the joint F-test (ρ1=ρ2=0) or the t-Max test. In this study we 
use the former given the low power of the t-Max test to investigate the asymmetric 
adjustment process. The lag changes in residuals was chosen using the Schwarz 
Information Criterion with a maximum of 10 lags allowed in the test. The joint 
F-statistics are reported for the cointegration and asymmetric adjustment tests and 
the critical values are from Enders and Siklos (2001).
Table 6 reports the test results for the threshold cointegration and asymmetric 
adjustment process based on the TAR and MTAR models. The results are presented 
by sector, whereby both the TAR and MTAR models are estimated for each sector’s 
spread. The threshold values for both the TAR and MTAR models were obtained 
using Chan (1993) procedure based on the criteria of the minimized sum of squared 
residuals. Also, the diagnostic analysis for the TAR and MTAR models indicate the 
absence of serial correlation from the Ljung-Box Q-statistics at 8 lags. 
In order to test for threshold cointegration, the null hypothesis of ρ1=ρ2=0 is 
compared against the critical values given by Enders and Siklos (2001) at one, five 
and 10 percent levels of statistical significance. Therefore, it is possible to reject the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration (ρ1=ρ2=0) at one percent significant level for 
both models of all sectors in the study. Further, we test the null hypothesis of ρ1=ρ2 
(symmetric adjustment) for all sectors after establishing cointegration. The null 
hypothesis of symmetric adjustment is only rejected for agriculture and non-bank 
financial institutions and the overall weighted average (WA) under the TAR model 
at 10 percent significance level, while other sectors’ lending-deposit rate spread 
exhibit symmetric adjustment process. Hence, the TAR model indicates that the 
agriculture and weighted average lending-deposit rate spread tend to adjust to its 
long run equilibrium faster when the spread is below the threshold than when it 
is above. However, the non-bank financial institutions’ lending-deposit rate tends 
to revert to its long-run equilibrium faster when the spread is above the threshold 
than when it is below.
The MTAR model does not only reject the null hypothesis of symmetric 
adjustment, but also shows a significant presence of asymmetric adjustment 
(ρ1≠ρ2) process for agriculture, building and construction, manufacturing, non-
bank financial institutions, professional and business services, private individuals, 
real estate and the wholesale and retail sectors as well as the overall weighted 
average. On the other hand, we failed to reject the null hypothesis of symmetric 
adjustment for the transport and storage lending-deposit spread. 
Under the MTAR model, the asymmetric adjustment process is homogeneous 
across all sectorial lending-deposit spread. Given that ρ1>ρ2 across all sectorial 
spread except for transport and storage, this indicates that the spread tends to 
tremendously persist toward the thresholds when the lending-deposit rate 
spread is narrowing (rising deposit rate) than when the spread is widening 
(falling deposit rate). In similar terms, the lending-deposit rate spread is faster 
to adjust to the threshold when the spread is widening (falling deposit rate) than 
when the spread is narrowing (rising deposit rate). The MTAR model, therefore, 
supports our hypothesis that the commercial banks in Fiji adjust the lending rates 
differently to rising versus falling deposit rates. This empirical finding is consistent 
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with Nguyen and Islam (2010) as well as the consumer reaction theory by Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981). This finding contradicts Thompson’s (2006) finding, in terms of 
direction of adjustment.
Table 6.
Threshold Cointegration and Asymmetric Adjustment Test
This table reports the result from TAR and MTAR models. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels. The estimated parameters, test statistics, and critical values are rounded off to three decimal places. The critical 
values for the joint F-test (ρ1=ρ2=0) for threshold cointegration and F-equal test (ρ1=ρ2) for asymmetric adjustment at 5 
percent significance levels was obtained from Enders and Siklos (2001). The threshold value is τ and the optimum lag 
length is selected on using the general-to-specific approach. Spread is the arithmetic difference between the lending 
rate and the deposit rate. For instance, AGR indicator in the table is the difference between the agriculture lending 
rate and the time deposit rate. The Ljung-Box Q-statistic provides the test for serial correlation at 8 lags with the 
null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Abbreviations for other spreads between lending and deposit rates are BC – 
Building and Construction, MAN – Manufacturing, NBFI – Non-Bank Financial Institutions, PBS – Professional and 
Business Services, PI – Private Individuals, RE – Real Estate, TS – Transport and Storage, WR – Wholesale and Retail 
and WA – Weighted Average.
Spread Model ρ1 ρ2 τ ρ1=ρ2=0 ρ1=ρ2 AIC Q(8)
AGR
TAR -0.122*** -0.202*** -0.707 15.655*** 2.806* 0.846 2.668[0.953]
MTAR -0.202*** -0.086* -0.214 17.775*** 4.817** 0.844 1.155[0.997]
BC
TAR -0.132*** -0.209*** 0.318 13.401*** 2.112 0.629 0.558[1.000]
MTAR -0.260*** -0.095** 0.021 17.588*** 9.658*** 0.596 1.394[0.994]
MAN
TAR -0.081** -0.137*** -0.653 8.083*** 1.393 0.678 2.315[0.970]
MTAR -0.228*** -0.065** 0.143 12.320*** 9.343*** 0.643 3.438[0.904]
NBFI
TAR -0.415*** -0.102 1.021 14.877*** -3.085*** 2.841 2.039[0.980]
MTAR -0.548*** -0.125* 0.252 24.744*** 17.851*** 2.799 2.808[0.946]
PBS
TAR -0.084** -0.129*** -0.429 9.463*** 0.991 0.52 1.438[0.994]
MTAR -0.208*** -0.018 -0.062 18.562*** 17.861*** 0.449 2.309[0.970]
PI
TAR -0.099*** -0.153*** -0.605 16.239*** 2.332 0.202 0.727[0.999]
MTAR -0.159*** -0.071** -0.152 17.959*** 5.368** 0.189 0.5983[1.000]
RE
TAR -0.076** -0.123*** -0.512 6.759*** 0.748 0.546 6.169[0.628]
MTAR -0.194*** -0.075** 0.148 9.812*** 4.185** 0.536 10.853[0.210]
TS
TAR -0.134*** -0.126*** 0.461 11.278*** 0.027 1.016 4.368[0.823]
MTAR -0.112*** -0.141*** -0.01 10.600*** 0.32 1.015 5.785[0.671]
WR
TAR -0.123*** -0.153*** 0.304 10.225*** 0.312 0.697 1.099[0.998]
MTAR -0.229*** -0.086** 0.092 13.843*** 6.954*** 0.668 1.361[0.995]
WA
TAR -0.062** -0.129*** -0.551 8.824*** 2.866* 0.201 3.499[0.899]
MTAR -0.151*** -0.076*** 0.002 13.531*** 3.364* 0.198 3.749[0.879]
Overall, the MTAR model generally supports our hypothesis because it detects 
asymmetric adjustment process in the sectorial lending-deposit rate spread as 
compared to the TAR model. The results of the MTAR model is more reliable given 
that it produces the lowest Akaike Information Criterion than the TAR model, as 
evidenced in Table 6. Similarly, Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos 
(2001) also refer to greater predictive power of the MTAR model over the TAR 
model.
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V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The Fijian banking sector has gone through a number of reforms over the years 
due to changes in both the economic and political environment. The finding of 
asymmetric adjustment behaviour in sector-specific lending-deposit rate spread 
has important policy implications. This study immensely contributes to the 
adjustment behaviour in the lending-deposit spread in the Fijian banking industry 
and is the first to provide evidence of discriminatory asymmetric adjustment in 
lending-deposit spread at the sectorial level of the economy. 
The MTAR model shows that lending-deposit rate spread are fast to adjust 
to the long-run position when the spread is widening (falling deposit rate) than 
when the spread is narrowing (rising deposit rate) for the agriculture, building 
and construction, manufacturing, non-bank financial institutions, professional and 
business services, private individuals, real estate and wholesale and retail sectors 
as well as the overall weighted average lending-deposit rate spread. On the other 
hand, the transport and storage sectors’lending-deposit rate spread has symmetric 
adjustment behaviour. The asymmetric adjustment process is homogeneous 
across eight sectors and is explained by the consumer reaction theory of Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981). The results indicate that Fijian banks are reluctant to adjust their 
lending rates upward relative to rising deposit rates because of fear of a negative 
reaction from high profile customers and threats of customers switching to other 
banks offering attractive borrowing rates. In fact, the banks are fast to adjust their 
lending rates downward for these sectors when deposit rates decrease for positive 
feedback and to attract other highly lucrative customers.
Our findings do not only provide empirical evidence of the asymmetric 
adjustment process of the interest spread in Fiji, but also have major policy 
implications. The lending-deposit rate spread is found to adjust faster to long-
run equilibrium when the spread is widening than when the spread is narrowing. 
This implies that quantitative easing policies of the central bank is likely to have 
an immediate positive impact on all sectors of the economy. The central bank can 
effectively use quantitative easing monetary policies to boost economic activities 
in most sectors when the economy is showing signs of slow down or stagnation. 
A fall in the deposit rate will have an immediate downward pressure on the 
lending rates of the commercial banks across most sectors of the economy. This 
observation is particularly relevant to addressing the adverse impact of COVID-19 
on the economy. 
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